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The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Islamic banks have greater market power than con-
ventional banks. An Islamic bank, for example, might enjoy enhanced market power if a captive 
clientele adhering to religious principles permits it to charge higher prices. To measure market 
power, we compute Lerner indices for a sample of banks from 17 countries where Islamic and con-
ventional banks coexist. Comparison of Lerner indices shows no significant difference between Is-
lamic banks and conventional banks over the period 2000-2007. When including control variables, 
regression of Lerner indices even suggests that Islamic banks have less market power than conven-
tional banks. A robustness check with the Rosse-Panzar model confirms that Islamic banks are no 
less competitive than conventional banks. Thus, any reduced market power of Islamic banks can be 
attributed to differences in norms and incentives. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan, onko islamilaisilla pankeilla enemmän markkinavoimaa kuin 
tavanomaisilla pankeilla. Islamilaisella pankilla voisi olla enemmän markkinavoimaa esimerkiksi 
tilanteessa, jossa uskonnollisiin periaatteisiin nojaava asiakaskunta mahdollistaa sen, että pankki 
perii korkeampia hintoja. Markkinavoiman mittaamiseksi tutkimuksessa lasketaan Lerner-indeksejä 
otokselle pankkeja sellaisista 17 eri maasta, joissa toimii sekä tavanomaisia että islamilaisia pank-
keja. Lerner-indekseissä ei ilmene eroja islamilaisten ja tavanomaisten pankkien välillä tarkastelua-
jankohtana 2000-2007. Kun analyysissä on mukana kontrollimuuttujia, Lerner-indekseillä tehdyt 
regressiot osoittavat, että islamilaisilla pankeilla on jopa vähemmän markkinavoimaa kuin tava-
nomaisilla pankeilla. Robustisuustarkastelu Rosse-Panzar – mallilla osoittaa, että islamilaiset pankit 
eivät ole vähemmän kilpailukykyisiä kuin tavalliset pankit. Tämän vuoksi islamilaisten pankkien 
mahdollisesti  pienempi  markkinavoima  on  seurausta  normeissa  ja  kannustimissa  ilmenevistä 
eroista.   
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1  Introduction  
 
Islamic banks have gained in popularity in recent decades. Since the creation of the first modern 
Islamic bank in 1975, the number of such institutions has increased to over 300 operating in over 75 
countries. Total assets of Islamic banks worldwide are estimated at about US$ 300 billion with an 
annual growth rate exceeding 15% over the past decade (Chong and Liu, 2009).
2 
Despite this development, the academic literature, which keeps increasing, still has little to 
say about the economic implications of Islamic banking relative to conventional banking. Con-
ceivably, this could have important implications if Islamic banks differ from conventional banks in 
ways that foster or hamper economic development relative to conventional banks. 
A key issue here is the market power of Islamic banks. Market power is the ability of a 
firm to influence the price of products and therefore directly linked to competition as greater com-
petition reduces market power. Islamic banks might benefit, for example, from a clientele with a 
more inelastic demand driven by religious principles that confers greater market power than con-
ventional banks. In most countries with Islamic banks, a few Islamic banks coexist with conven-
tional banks. Therefore, religious clients out of respect for the Sharia may be more loyal to Islamic 
banks than non-religious clients in all categories of banks. Indeed, El-Gamal (2007) mentions that 
some providers and observers of the Islamic banking industry refer to these additional charges and 
rates for clients of Islamic banks as “the cost of being Muslim,” and stresses the possibility of such 
overpricing.
3 Kuran (2004) supports this view by observing that Islamic banks operating in Turkey 
managed to quickly attract one percent of total deposits in just a few months with a small number of 
branches. 
The comparative analysis of market power between Islamic and conventional banks is a 
fundamental issue for economic development, as several studies have shown the importance of 
market power for economic development (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; 
Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). In a nutshell, the argument here is that greater bank competition en-
hances access to credit at lower cost, which, in turn, leads to increase borrowing by firms and pro-
motes growth. More generally, enhancement of bank competition can favor financial development 
by increasing access to financial products and, as the literature shows, creating a positive link be-
                                                 
2 For a complete reference on Islamic banking, see Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007). 
3 In an interview, El-Gamal argues that he worries about the possibility that “some sectors of the Muslim American 
population might be willing to pay $500 more to buy peace of mind.”  
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tween financial development and economic development (Levine, 2005) that fosters economic de-
velopment. 
Here, we measure and compare the market power of Islamic banks and conventional banks 
by computing Lerner indices for a wide cross-country sample of banks from 17 MENA and South-
eastern Asian countries, where Islamic banks and conventional banks coexist. The observation pe-
riod covers 2000-2007. The Lerner index has been widely used in recent studies focusing on market 
power in banking (Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 2005; Fernandez de Guevara and 
Maudos, 2007; Solis and Maudos, 2008). 
Although no empirical work to our best knowledge has investigated this issue, two papers 
loosely relate to our work as they provide elements of comparison between Islamic and conven-
tional banks through empirical works at the bank level. In an analysis of efficiency of Turkish banks 
for the period 1990-2000, El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) compare efficiency among various types 
of banks, including a few Islamic banks (“special finance houses”). They find no significant differ-
ence in efficiency between Islamic banks and other banks. Cihak and Hesse (2008) perform a com-
parative analysis of Islamic and conventional banks in terms of financial stability. They compare 
the Z-score, an inverse measure of the bank’s probability of failure, for a sample of banks from 18 
countries, and find that small Islamic banks are financially stronger than small conventional banks, 
while large conventional banks are financially stronger than large Islamic banks. Finally, Olson and 
Zoubi (2008) compare the accounting ratios of Islamic and conventional banks for the Gulf Coop-
eration Council countries. Notably, they conclude in favor of a greater profitability for Islamic 
banks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Methodology is reported in section 2. Section 




2  Methodology 
 
Empirical research on the measurement of bank competition provides several tools. These can be 
divided into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and newer empirical IO approaches. The 
traditional IO approach proposes tests of market structure to assess bank competition based on the 
Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) model. The SCP hypothesis argues that greater concentration 
causes less competitive bank conduct and leads to greater profitability of the bank. In this model,  
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competition is measured by concentration indices such as the market share of the largest banks or 
the Herfindahl index. These tools were widely applied until the 1990s. 
The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent the problems 
with competition measures in the traditional IO approach. Traditional competition measures suffer 
from the fact that they infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such as market structure 
or market shares. In contrast, non-structural measures do not infer the competitive conduct of banks 
through the analysis of market structure, but rather measure bank conduct directly. The measures 
from the new empirical IO include the Rosse-Panzar model, which provide an aggregate measure of 
competition, and the Lerner index, an individual measure of market power. 
Here, we compute the Lerner index as our goal is to determine the market power of each 
bank in our sample. The Lerner index has been computed in several recent studies on bank competi-
tion (e.g. Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, 2007; Carbo et al., 2009). It is defined as the 
difference between price and marginal cost, divided by price. 
Following  Fernandez  de  Guevara,  Maudos  and  Perez  (2005)  and  Carbo  et  al.  (2009) 
among others, price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production (proxied by 
total assets) as the ratio of total revenues to total assets. Marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a 
translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input prices (price of labor, price of 
physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). One cost function is estimated for each year to allow 
technology to change over time. Symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions in input prices are 
imposed. The cost function is specified as 
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where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w1 the price of labor (the ratio of personnel expenses to 
total assets),
4 w2 the price of physical capital (the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed as-
sets), w3 the price of borrowed funds (the ratio of interest expenses to all funding). Total costs are 
the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses, and interest expenses. The indices for 
each bank have been dropped from the presentation for the sake of simplicity. The estimated coeffi-
cients of the cost function are then used to compute the marginal cost (MC) such that 
                                                 
4 The Bankscope database does not provide information on the number of employees, so we use this proxy variable for 
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Once marginal cost has been estimated and price of output computed, we calculate the 
Lerner index for each bank to obtain a direct measure of bank competition. 
 
 
3   Data 
 
The sample used in this study includes banks of 17 countries (Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indone-
sia,  Iran,  Jordan,  Kuwait,  Malaysia,  Mauritania,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  Sudan,  Tunisia,  Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates, Yemen). In all the countries Islamic banks and conventional banks coexisted 
during the period 2000-2007. 
In line with earlier cross-country studies that include Islamic banks (Al-Muharrami, Mat-
thews and Khabari, 2006; Viverita, Brown and Skully, 2007; Cihak and Hesse, 2008), we use the 
Bankscope database to collect data from financial statements of the banks. We use unconsolidated 
accounting data of banks. 
We adopt a Tukey boxplot and use an interquartile range to clean data (i.e. banks with ob-
servations out of the range defined by the first and third quartiles that are greater or less than twice 
the interquartile range are dropped for each input price). We also perform truncations for the Lerner 
indices, dropping all outliers. These criteria produce a sample of 1,301 observations for 264 banks 
(135 observations for 34 Islamic banks and 1,166 observations for 230 conventional banks). The 
sample is described by country and bank type in Table 1. 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the variables adopted in the estimations. The simi-
larities between the two bank types are quite striking. No significant difference in bank size can be 
observed. The mean Islamic bank has USD 3.27 million in total assets compared to USD 3.78 mil-
lion for the mean conventional bank. Mean input prices for labor and physical capital are also quite 
similar. The only substantial difference concerns the price of borrowed funds, which is greater for 
conventional banks (4.93% vs. 3.50% for Islamic banks). This dissimilarity relates to the higher eq-
uity-to-assets ratio observed for Islamic banks (14.72% vs. 10.95% for conventional banks). As Is-
lamic banks rely more on equity, they may have lower charges on borrowed funds. We observe a 
major difference for activities with the analysis of the ratio of loans to investment assets, which is 
by far greater for conventional banks. This is in line with the different activities practiced by Is-
lamic banks and conventional banks. These latter dissimilarities suggest it may be worthwhile to  
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include the equity-to-assets and loans-to-investment-assets ratios in the estimations explaining mar-
ket power as they constitute key differences between the two bank types. 
 
 
4  Results 
 
This section presents our results for the differences in market power between Islamic and conven-
tional banks. We start with the Lerner indices for each bank type. Next, we perform regressions of 
the Lerner index on a set of variables to take control variables into account. Finally, we perform a 
robustness check with an alternative measure of competition. 
 
4.1   Market power measures 
 
We present the means of Lerner indices in Table 3 for each bank type and each year. The average 
Lerner index for the period is 23.71% with yearly means ranging from 18.80% to 27.13%. These 
figures are comparable to what is found in other studies. For instance, Fernandez de Guevara and 
Maudos (2007) find yearly mean Lerner indices between 16.9% and 24.9% for Spanish banks, 
while Carbo et al. (2009) observe mean Lerner indices at the country level ranging from 11% to 
22% for EU countries with an EU mean of 16%. In dynamic terms, the evolution of the Lerner in-
dex shows a strong increase between 2000 and 2005 and a reduction in market power between 2005 
and 2007. 
The key issue here, however, concerns the comparison of market power between Islamic 
and conventional banks. The mean Lerner indices over the period are 24.37% for Islamic banks and 
23.64% for conventional banks. The difference in favor of Islamic banks is not systematic; our 
year-by-year  analysis  shows  Islamic banks  outperform  conventional  banks  in  five  years of our 
analysis. The opposite holds for the three other years observed. Nonetheless, the main finding is that 
the difference in market power is not significant for any given year considered separately or the full 
period. 
Thus, our major conclusion is that there is no significant difference in the market power of 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. This finding does not support arguments that Islamic banks 
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However, this analysis does not consider the possible role of other characteristics of two 
bank types. Further, the fact that banks operate in different countries should be taken into account. 
Thus, we perform a regression of Lerner indices on a set of variables that includes bank type and 
several control variables. 
 
4.2   Regression 
 
We perform a random effects GLS regression of the Lerner indices. This specification is motivated 
by the use of panel data and the fact that the key explanatory variable (whether or not the bank is 
Islamic) is constant over time. The set of explanatory variables includes a dummy variable equal to 
one if the bank is Islamic, and zero if it is not (Islamic). Following Fernandez de Guevara and Mau-
dos (2007), we include control variables to control for risk, size, and activities. We consider the ra-
tio of loans to investment assets (Loans to Investment Assets) to take the mix of assets into account, 
the ratio of equity to total assets (Equity to Total Assets) to control for risk aversion, and size meas-
ured by the logarithm of total assets (Bank Size). We also include dummy variables for countries 
and years in the regression. 
Turning to the analysis of control variables, we observe a significantly positive sign for the 
size of the bank. This is in line with the fact that bigger banks enjoy greater market power. The ratio 
of loans to investment assets is not significant, meaning that the structure of assets between loans 
and investment assets does not influence market power. Finally, the ratio of equity to assets is sig-
nificantly positive, i.e. banks with greater solvency have higher market power. This finding may be 
explained by the fact that better solvency allows the banks to charge higher prices for their services. 
Indeed, several papers demonstrate the existence of market discipline among depositors, particu-
larly in developing and transition countries where the risk of bank failure is substantial (e.g. Karas, 
Pyle and Schoors, 2009). This discipline means that depositors adapt their deposits to their percep-
tion of the probability of bank failure. Thus, better solvency favors confidence of depositors in the 
bank’s financial situation, so banks can charge depositors more for the perceived safety of their as-
sets. 
Our main finding is that Islamic banks do not have a greater market power than conven-
tional banks. Our results from the regression even tend to show that Islamic banks have a lower 
market power. 
Thus, we do not concur with the view that Islamic banks benefit from a captive religious 
clientele that allows them to charge higher prices. So what does explain the lower market power of  
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Islamic banks? Explanations focus on the different religious or economic incentives of  Islamic 
banks. 
One explanation may be the different objectives of Islamic banks in line with the values of 
Islamic economics. Islamic finance is a part of a global paradigm, Islamic economics, which can be 
defined as the economics in accordance with the principles of the Qur’an and the Sunna. While Is-
lamic finance forms the centerpiece of Islamic economics, this “third way” approach to economics 
includes other features such as the promotion of Islamic norms of economic behavior. 
Hasan (2004) notes Islamic banks have different objectives than conventional banks. Profit 
is an objective for Islamic banks, but is merely seen as a survival requirement. Islam aims at estab-
lishing a distinct social order, so the prohibition on charging interest is not in itself an objective of 
Islamic banks, but rather a rule that helps Islamic banks contribute to establish a world governed 
according to Islamic economic principles. A fundamental value of Islam is the promotion of mutual 
help and cooperation. As a consequence, Kuran (2004) explains that a producer or a trader is free to 
seek personal profit but must avoid harming others, and, therefore, must charge only fair prices to 
his customers. In other words, Islamic banks have the obligation to charge fair prices, which could 
well limit their ability to charge the maximal price accorded by their market power. 
A major debate in the literature concerns the practice of these specific norms in Islamic 
banks.  Kuran (1995) observes  similar returns on savings  deposits  for  Islamic and conventional 
banks in Turkey, while El-Gamal (2007) provides examples of an Islamic bank explicitly mention-
ing that its loan rates are similar to those of conventional banks. 
Some explanations can also be suggested which are based on the economic incentives for 
an Islamic bank to charge lower prices than other banks. Islamic banks may have greater incentives 
to avoid moral hazard behavior of borrowers, which gives them incentives to charge lower loan 
rates than conventional banks. The reasoning is based on the argument from Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005). They point out that lower loan rates allow easier the repayment of loans, and consequently 
reduce the moral hazard that arises when borrowers get involved in risky projects. Thus, these 
banks would enjoy a lower risk of default by borrowers. As a consequence, the bank’s response to 
moral hazard behavior on the part of borrowers is to charge lower rates. As Islamic banks follow the 
profit-and-loss-sharing paradigm in opposition to conventional banks which charge fixed repay-
ments, Islamic banks are more susceptible to moral hazard behavior as their return is riskier. They 
consequently have strong incentives to discourage moral hazard behavior and then to charge lower 
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We also see that depositors of Islamic banks are in a position similar to shareholders. In-
stead of receiving a fixed interest rate, they share in the profits and losses of the bank. Ironically, 
greater profits from depositor services could mean the depositors themselves are charged higher 
prices for such services. Thus, the bank also has an incentive to refrain from charging depositors 
heavily for financial services. 
Finally, a last argument can also be advanced which is not guided by specific features of 
Islamic banking. Islamic banking is a relatively recent industry, so an Islamic bank is likely to be 
younger than a conventional bank. The literature suggests the presence of switching costs in the 
banking industry that notably derive from the time and effort involved in closing out accounts with 
one bank and become comfortable with a new bank (Kim, Kliger and Vale, 2003), or can also 
endogenously  result  from  the  better  information  of  the  bank  on  their  clients  than  competitors 
(Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). As a consequence, the clientele of relatively young Islamic banks may 
be less captive, which prevents them from enjoying market power on par with other banks. 
 
4.3   A robustness check 
 
To further address the validity of the results, we use an alternative measure for bank competition in 
our estimations. We estimate the Rosse-Panzar model (Rosse and Panzar, 1977), which has been 
widely applied in banking (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004, for 50 countries; Al-Muharrami, Mat-
thews and Khabari, 2006, for the six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council). This is a 
non-structural test, meaning that it takes into account the actual behavior of banks without using 
information on the structure of the banking market. The H-statistic aggregates the elasticities of to-
tal revenues to the input prices. It determines the nature of market structure: it is equal to 0 in mo-
nopoly, between 0 and 1 in monopolistic competition, and 1 in perfect competition. 
Several recent studies aiming to explain banking competition have used the H-statistic as a 
measure of competition in regressions (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). We 
follow their approach by considering the H-statistic as a measure of competition and checking the 
difference in the H-statistic between bank types. 
Our aim is to have a measure of competition for each bank type and each year. We run the 
Rosse-Panzar model for year to obtain estimates of input prices specific to each year. As we need 
estimates of the coefficients of input prices specific to each bank type, we include interactive terms 
for each input price, joining the variable with a dummy variable for each bank type. For each year, 
we estimate the following equation   
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ln REVENUES   =   + [  (ln w1) + (ln w2)+ (ln w3)] ISLAM   
+ [  (ln w1) + (ln w2)+ (ln w3)] CONVENTIONAL  
+   ln ASSETS  +  ln EQUITY TO ASSETS 
+COUNTRY DUMMIES, 
 
where REVENUES are total revenues, w1, w2 and w3 prices of labor, physical capital, and borrowed 
funds, respectively (defined below), ASSETS total assets, EQASS the ratio of equity to total assets, k 
country,  ISLAM  dummy  variable  equal  to  one  whether  the  bank  is  Islamic,  CONVENTIONAL 
dummy variable equal to one if the bank is conventional. Similar to Bikker and Haaf (2002), the 
variable ASSETS takes into account differences in size and EQUITY TO ASSETS differences in risk. 
Indices for each bank have been dropped in the presentation for simplicity. Thus, the H-statistic is 
equal to  + + for Islamic banks and  + + for conventional banks. 
The results of the Rosse-Panzar model appear in Table 5. We observe values between 
0.3512 and 0.6233 for all bank types and all years, which suggests a monopolistic competition 
structure. This result is in accordance with most former studies estimating the Rosse-Panzar model 
(e.g. Bikker and Haaf, 2002). Al-Muharrami, Matthews and Khabari (2006) found an H-statistic for 
the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates) for the period 1993-2002. The value was of 0.47 with country fixed effects 
and 0.24 in a pooled model. While our results are in line with the conclusion of monopolistic com-
petition of this paper, we observe a higher level of competition that likely results from differences 
in the sample of countries and a more recent period when competition has increased. 
In any case, the key result is that the H-statistic is greater for Islamic banks than for con-
ventional banks for all years. This difference is only significant in 2005 and 2007. Therefore, the 
estimations of the Rosse-Panzar model tend to corroborate our main finding that Islamic banks are 
no less competitive than conventional banks. 
 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we compared the market power of Islamic and conventional banks by computing 
Lerner indices for a large sample of banks from countries in which both types of banks coexist. Our 
hypothesis was that market power is greater for Islamic banks, in line with the view that these insti-
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are to understand the normative implications of the expansion of Islamic banks as it has been shown 
that lower bank competition can be detrimental to national economic growth. 
Our findings clearly reject this hypothesis.  A comparison of Lerner indices shows no sig-
nificant difference in market power between Islamic and conventional banks. Furthermore, the re-
gression of market power indices even suggests a lower market power for Islamic banks. 
We explain the lower market power of Islamic banks by their different religious and eco-
nomic incentives. Islamic banks are supposed to respect Islamic norms of behavior such as the obli-
gation to charge fair prices. Adherence to this rule could limit their ability to charge high prices. 
Furthermore, Islamic banks have incentives to charge lower loan rates than conventional banks and 
face higher exposure to moral hazard behavior of borrowers. 
Thus, our findings do not support the concerns of detrimental effects resulting from the ex-
pansion of Islamic banks in terms of market power. Nevertheless, the results of this study should be 
taken with a heavy dose of caution. As this the first paper on this issue, further work could help 
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Table 1 Overview of the sample 
 
 
This table gives the number of observations for each bank type and each country. 
 
 






Bahrain  38  24  14 
Bangladesh  222  218  4 
Brunei  16  10  6 
Indonesia  249  244  5 
Iran  39  26  13 
Jordan  45  30  15 
Kuwait  39  32  7 
Malaysia  170  158  12 
Mauritania  26  19  7 
Pakistan  158  148  10 
Qatar  31  23  8 
Saudi Arabia  28  24  4 
Sudan  37  34  3 
Tunisia  107  100  7 
Turkey  38  32  6 
United Arab Emirates  46  42  4 
Yemen  12  2  10 
All  1301  1166  135 
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Table 2  Summary statistics 
 
 
This table displays the means for variables used in subsequent estimations for each bank type.  
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
  All banks  Conventional banks  Islamic banks 
Total assets (USD thousand)            3,719.65 
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Table 3  Lerner indices 
 
 
This table presents the Lerner index for each year and bank type. Lerner indices are given as per-
centages and standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. 
 
 




Difference  p-value 






-1.51  0.73 






-0.14  0.97 






0.36  0.93 






5.36  0.20 






5.43  0.17 






-3.28  0.43 






-5.43  0.12 






-1.79  0.63 






-0.74  0.61 
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Table 4  Regression 
 
 
Random effects GLS regression. The dependent variable is the Lerner index. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level. Dummy variables for countries 




Explanatory variables  Coefficient  Standard error 
Intercept 
 
-11.342  7.511 
Islamic 
 
-4.504*  2.547 
Bank Size 
 
2.515***  0.414 
Loans to Investment Assets 
 
0.002  0.006 
Equity to Assets 
 
71.133***  5.752 
R²  0.3333   
Number of banks  264   
Number of observations  1301   
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Table 5  Robustness check: The Rosse-Panzar model 
 
 
This table displays the H-statistic estimated by the Rosse-Panzar model for each year and bank type. 
We compute the Wald test (F-statistic) to test whether there is a significant difference between the 
H-statistic for Islamic and conventional banks. *, **, *** denote an F-statistic significantly different 




  Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Wald test (F-statistic) 
2000 
 
0.5145  0.5991  0.91 
2001 
 
0.5473  0.6233  1.08 
2002 
 
0.4755  0.5526  0.80 
2003 
 
0.4003  0.4431  0.26 
2004 
 
0.3512  0.4084  1.08 
2005 
 
0.3573  0.4629  3.95** 
2006 
 
0.5271  0.5320  0.01 
2007 
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